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between an RFID tag and a reader to exchange a secret 
without performing any expensive computation.  The paper 
introduced an NFC specific key agreement mechanism, which 
provides cheap and fast secure key agreement. Key 
agreement techniques without authentication can be used to 
provide a standard secure channel. This resistance against 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks makes NFC an ideal method for se-
cure pairing of devices. The paper lists some of threats, which 
are applicable to NFC, and describes solutions to protect 
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I.
 
Introduction
 
ear Field Communication (NFC) is a technology 
for high frequency wireless short-distance point-
to-point communication. The operational range 
for NFC is within less than 20 cm which is good from a 
security perspective as it diminishes the threat of 
eavesdropping. Other reasons to use NFC are the low 
cost of the necessary components and that the 
connecting time is negligible. It is small circuit attached 
to a small antenna, capable of transmitting data to a 
distance of several meters to a reader device (reader) in 
response to a query.
 
Most RFID tags are passive, 
meaning that they are battery-less, and obtain their 
power from the query signal. They are already attached 
to almost anything: clothing, foods, access cards and so 
on. It is impossible to give a complete picture of NFC 
applications as NFC is just an interface. Contactless 
Token covers most of applications, which use NFC to 
retrieve some data from a passive token. The passive 
token could be a contactless Smart Card, an RFID label, 
or a key fob. In Ticketing / Micro Payment application 
example, the NFC interface is used to transfer some 
valuable information. The ticket or the micro payment 
data is stored in a secure device. This could be a 
contactless Smart Card, but could as well be a mobile 
phone.
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When the user wants to perform a payment or use the 
stored ticket, the user presents the device to a reader, 
which checks the received information and processes 
the payment or accepts/rejects the ticket. In this 
application example the user device must be
 
able to 
perform a certain protocol with the reader. A simple read 
operation will not be sufficient in most cases. Also, the 
user device is likely to have a second interface which is 
used to load money or to buy tickets. This second 
interface can for example be linked to the mobile phone 
CPU. The ticket data could then be loaded into the 
mobile phone via the cellular network. Because NFC is a 
wireless communication interface it is obvious that threat 
is an important issue. When two devices communicate 
via NFC they use RF waves to talk to each other. An 
attacker can of course use an antenna to also receive 
the transmitted signals. Either by experimenting or by 
literature research the attacker can have the required 
knowledge on how to extract the transmitted
 
data out of 
the received RF signal. Also the equipment required to 
receive the RF signal as well as the equipment to 
decode the RF signal must be assumed to be available 
to an attacker as there is no special equipment 
necessary. In this paper we use a systematic approach 
to analyze the various aspects of security whenever an 
NFC interface is used. We want to clear up many 
misconceptions about security and NFC in various 
applications. The paper lists the threats, which are 
applicable to NFC, and describes solutions to protect 
against these threats. The rest of this paper is organized 
as follows. A brief description about NFC operation 
modes are
 
given in Section (2).  A list of threats
technique is discussed in Section (3). Real solution 
against these threats and establishes a secure channel
is presented in Section (4). Finally, concluding remarks 
are made in Section (5).
 
 
Figure1– Typical communication procedure
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a) Manchester  code 
 
Figure.2 (b) Modified Miller code  
II. NFC Operation Modes 
NFC can operate in two modes. The modes are 
distinguished whether a device creates its own RF field 
or whether a device retrieves the power from the RF field 
generated by another device. If the device generates its 
own field and has a power supply, it is called an active 
device; otherwise it is called a passive device. When two 
devices communicate three different configurations are 
possible (Active-Active, Active-Passive, and Passive-
Active). These configurations are important because the 
way data is transmitted depends on whether the 
transmitting device is in active or passive mode. 
In active mode the data is sent using amplitude 
shift keying (ASK) [1],[2]. This means the base RF signal 
(13,56 MHz) is modulated with the data according to a 
coding scheme. If the baudrate is 106 kBaud, the coding 
scheme is the so-called modified Miller coding. If the 
baudrate is greater than 106 kBaud the Manchester 
coding scheme is applied. As shown in figure 2, each 
single data bit in both coding schemes is sent in a fixed 
time slot. This time slot is divided into two halves, called 
half bits. In Miller coding a zero is encoded with a pause 
in the first half bit and no pause in the second half bit. A 
one is encoded with no pause in the first bit, but a pause 
in the second half bit. In the modified Miller coding some 
additional rules are applied on the coding of zeros. In 
the case of a one followed by a zero, two subsequent 
half bits would have a pause. Modified Miller coding 
avoids this by encoding a zero, which directly follows a 
one with two half bits with no pause. 
In the Manchester coding the situation is nearly 
the same, but instead of having a pause in the first or 
second half bit, the whole half bit is either a pause or 
modulated.  
Besides the coding scheme also the strength of 
the modulation depends on the baudrate. For 106 
kBaud 100% modulation is used. This means that in a 
pause the RF signal is actually zero. No RF signal is sent 
in a pause. For baudrates greater than 106 kBaud 10% 
modulation ratio is used. According to the definition of 
this modulation ratio [1], this means that in a pause the 
RF signal is not zero, but it is about 82% of the level of a 
non paused signal. This difference in the modulation 
strength is very important from a security point of view 
as we will describe later on in the security analysis. 
In passive mode the data is sent using a weak 
load modulation. The data is always encoded using 
Manchester coding with a modulation of 10%. For 106 
kBaud a subcarrier frequency is used for the modulation, 
for baudrates greater than 106 kBaud the base RF signal 
at 13.56 MHz is modulated. 
Additionally to the active and passive mode, 
there are two different roles a device can play in NFC 
communication. NFC is based on a message and reply 
concept. This means one device A sends a message to 
another device B and device B sends back a reply. It is 
not possible for device B to send any data to device A 
without first receiving some message from device A, to 
which it could reply. The role of the device A which starts 
the data exchange is called initiator, the role of the other 
device is called target. Furthermore it should be 
mentioned that NFC communication is not limited to a 
pair of two devices. In fact one initiator device can talk to 
multiple target devices. In this case all target devices are 
enabled at the same time, but before sending a 
message, the initiator device must select a receiving 
device. The message must then be ignored by all non 
selected target devices. Only the selected target device 
is allowed to answer to the received data. Therefore, it is 
not possible to send data to more than one device at the 
same time (i.e. broadcasting messages are not 
possible).  
Typical communication procedure between the initiator 
and target can be highlighted as shown in figure 1. 
 Handshake: 
 The interrogator sends a command to start 
communication with transponder in the 
interrogator field and also to power it (passive 
transponders). 
 Once the tag has received sufficient energy and 
command from the reader, it reply’s with its ID 
for acknowledgment. 
 The reader now knows which tag is in the field 
and sends a command to the identified tag for 
instructions either for processing (read or write) 
or Sleep. 
 Data exchange: 
 If the tag receives processing and reading 
commands, it transmits a specified block data 
and waits for the next command. 
 If the tag receives processing and writing 
commands along with block data, it writes the 
block data into the specified memory block, and 
transmits the written block data for verification. 
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Although contactless token systems may 
emerge as one of the most pervasive computing 
technologies, there are still a vast number of problems 
that need to be solved before their massive deployment. 
One of the fundamental issues still to be addressed is 
privacy. Products labeled with tags reveal sensitive 
information when queried by readers, and they do it 
indiscriminately.
 
A problem closely related to privacy is tracking, 
or violations of location privacy. This is possible because 
the answers provided by tags are usually predictable: in 
fact, most of the times, tags provide always the same 
identifier, which will allow a third party to easily establish 
an association between a given tag and its holder or 
owner. Even in the case in which tags try not to reveal 
any kind of valuable information that could be used to 
identify themselves or their holder, there are many 
situations where, by using an assembly of tags 
(constellation), this tracking will still be possible. 
Although the two aforementioned problems are the most 
important security questions that arise from NFC 
technology, there are some others worth to mention:
 
1)
 
Eavesdropping Threats
 
In this type of attacks, unintended recipients are 
able to intercept and read messages.
 
The NFC communication is usually done 
between two devices in close proximity. This means they 
are not more than 10 cm (typically less) away from each 
other. The main question is how close an attacker needs 
to be to be able to retrieve a usable RF signal. 
Unfortunately, there is no correct answer to this 
question. The reason for that is the huge number of 
parameters which determine the distance depends on 
the following parameters,
 
•
 
RF filed characteristic of the given sender 
device (i.e. antenna geometry, shielding effect 
of the case, the PCB, the environment)
 
•
 
Characteristic of the attacker’s antenna (i.e. 
antenna geometry, possibility to change the 
position in all 3 dimensions)
 
•
 
Quality of the attacker’s receiver
 
•
 
Quality of the attacker’s RF signal decoder
 
Power sent out by the NFC device
 
 
Figure 3 Eavesdropping and Data Modification Threats
 
• Setup of the location where the attack is 
performed (e.g. barriers like walls or metal, 
noise floor level) 
Furthermore, eavesdropping is extremely 
affected by the communication mode. That’s because, 
based on the active or passive mode, the transferred 
data is coded and modulated differently.  If data is 
transferred with stronger modulation it can be attacked 
easier. Thus, a passive device, which does not generate 
its own RF field, is much harder to attack, than an active 
device. 
Therefore any exact number given would only 
be valid for a certain set of the above given parameters 
and cannot be used to derive general security 
guidelines. 
Avoiding eavesdropping can be done by 
establishing a secure channel as outlined in section 4.1. 
This requires the establishment of a session secret key, 
which is not always an easy task considering the very 
limited devices’ capacities. 
2) Data Modification Threats 
As shown in figure 3, instead of just listening, an 
attacker can also try to modify the data which is 
transmitted via the NFC interface. In the simplest case 
the attacker just wants to disturb the communication 
such that the receiver is not able to understand the data 
sent by the other device. 
In data modification, the attacker wants the 
receiving device to actually receive some valid, but 
manipulated data. This is very different from just data 
corruption. 
The feasibility of this attack highly depends on 
the applied strength of the amplitude modulation. This is 
because the decoding of the signal is different for 100% 
in modified Miller coding modulation and 10% in 
Manchester coding modulation. 
In 100% modulation the decoder checks the two 
half bits for RF signal on (no pause) or RF signal off 
(pause). In order to make the decoder understand a one 
as a zero or vice versa, the attacker must do two things. 
First, a pause in the modulation must be filled up with 
the carrier frequency. This is feasible. But, secondly, the 
attacker must generate a pause of the RF signal, which 
is received by the legitimate receiver. This means the 
attacker must send out some RF signal such that this 
signal perfectly overlaps with the original signal at the 
receiver’s antenna to give a zero signal at the receiver. 
This is practically impossible. However, due to the 
modified Miller coding in the case of two subsequent 
ones, the attacker can change the second one into a 
zero, by filling the pause, which encodes the second 
one. The decoder would then see no pause in the 
second bit and would decode this as a correct zero, 
because a one precedes it. In 100% modulation an 
attacker can therefore never change a bit of value 0 to a 
bit of value 1, but an attacker can change a bit of value 1 
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to a bit of value 0, in case this bit is preceded by a bit of 
value 1 (i.e. with a probability of 0.5).  In 10% modulation 
the decoder measures both signal levels (82% and Full) 
and compares them. In case they are in the correct 
range the signal is valid and gets decoded. An attacker 
could try to add a signal to the 82% signal, such that the 
82% signal appears as the Full signal and the actual Full 
signal becomes the 82% signal. This way the decode 
would decode a valid bit of the opposite value of the bit 
sent by the correct sender. Whether the attack is feasible 
depends a lot on the dynamic input range of the 
receiver. It is very likely that the much higher signal level 
of the modified signal would exceed the possible input 
range, but for certain situations this cannot be ruled out 
completely. The conclusion is that for the modified Miller 
encoding with 100% ASK this attack is feasible for 
certain bits and impossible for other bits, but for 
Manchester coding with 10% ASK this attack is feasible 
on all bits. 
Protection against data modification can be 
achieved in various ways. By using 106k Baud in active 
mode it gets impossible for an attacker to modify all the 
data transmitted via the RF link as described above. This 
means that for both directions active mode would be 
needed to protect against data modification. While this is 
possible, this has the major drawback, that this mode is 
most vulnerable to eavesdropping. In addition, the 
protection against modification is not perfect, as even at 
106k Baud some bits can be modified. The two other 
protection options might therefore be preferred. NFC 
devices can check the RF field while sending. This 
means the sending device could continuously check for 
such an attack and could stop the data transmission 
when an attack is detected. The third and probably best 
solution would be a secure channel as described in sec-
tion 4.1. 
3) Man-in-the-Middle Threats 
In Man-in-the-Middle Attack, two parties want to 
talk to each other, called Alice and Bob, are tricked into 
a three party conversation by an attacker Eve. This is 
shown in Figure 3. Assuming that Alice uses active 
mode and Bob would be in passive mode, we have the 
following situation. Alice generates the RF field and 
sends data to Bob. In case Eve is close enough, she 
can eavesdrop the data sent by Alice. Additionally she 
must actively disturb the transmission of Alice to make 
sure that Bob doesn’t receive the data. This is possible 
for Eve, but this can also be detected by Alice. In case 
Alice detects the disturbance, Alice can stop the key 
agreement protocol. Let’s assume Alice does not check 
for active disturbance and so the protocol can continue. 
In the next step Eve needs to send data to Bob. That’s 
already a problem, because the RF field generated by 
Alice is still there, so Eve has to generate a second RF 
field. This however, causes two RF fields to be active at 
the same time. It is practically impossible to perfectly 
align these two RF fields. Thus, it is practically 
impossible for Bob to understand data sent by Eve. 
Because of this and the possibility of Alice to detect the 
attack much earlier we conclude that in this setup a 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks is practically impossible. 
The only other possible setup is that Alice uses 
active mode and Bob uses active mode, too. In this case 
Alice sends some data to Bob. Eve can list and Eve 
again must disturb the transmission of Alice to make 
sure that Bob does not receive the data. At this point 
Alice could already detect the disturbance done by Eve 
and stop the protocol. Again, let us assume that Alice 
does not do this check and the protocol continues. In 
the next step Eve would need to send data to Bob. At 
first sight this looks better now, because of the active-
active communication Alice has turned off the RF field. 
Now Eve turns on the RF field and can send the data. 
The problem here now is that also Alice is listening as 
she is expecting an answer from Bob. Instead she will 
receive the data sent by Eve and can again detect a 
problem in the protocol and stop the protocol. It is 
impossible in this setup for Eve to send data either to 
Alice or Bob and making sure that this data is not 
received by Bob or Alice, respectively.  
We claim that due to the above given reasons it 
is practically infeasible to mount a Man-in-the-Middle 
attack in a real-world scenario. It is practically impossible 
to do a Man-in-the-Middle-Attack on an NFC link. 
Therefore, setup a secure channel with an active-passive 
communication mode as outlined in section 4.1 can be 
used to improve privacy and prevent tracking against 
Man-in-the-Middle-Attacks Additionally, the active party 
should listen to the RF filed while sending data to be 
able to detect any disturbances caused by a potential 
attacker. 
IV. Solutions and Recommendations 
In this section we present the best solutions 
proposed so far to solve the security problems and 
threats associated with the use of NFC systems. Our 
objective is not to give a detailed explanation of each 
solution, but to provide the fundamental principles and a 
critical review of every proposal. 
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Figure4 NFC specific Key Agreement 
 
Most of classical solution approach protecting 
the privacy of NFC communication is done by isolating 
them from any kind of electromagnetic waves. This can 
be made using what is known as a Faraday Cage (FC), 
a container made of metal mesh or foil that is 
impenetrable by radio signals (of certain frequencies). 
There are currently a number of companies that sell this 
type of solution [13]. Other solution is active jamming 
approach that disturbing the radio channel, RF signals. 
This disturbance may be done with a device that actively 
broadcasts radio signals, so as to completely disrupt the 
radio channel, thus preventing the normal operation of 
RFID readers. 
1)  Secure Channel for NFC  
Establishing a secure channel between two NFC 
devices is clearly the best approach to protect against 
eavesdropping, data modification attack, and enhance 
the inherent protection of NFC against Man-in-the-
Middle-Attacks. A standard key agreement protocol like 
Diffie-Hellmann based on RSA [4] or Elliptic Curves 
could be applied to establish a shared secret between 
two devices. The shared secret can then be used to 
derive a symmetric key like 3DES or AES, which is then 
used for the secure channel providing confidentiality, 
integrity, and authenticity of the transmitted data. Various 
modes of operation for 3DES and AES could be used for 
such a secure channel and can be found in literature [3]. 
2)  Proposed NFC Key Agreement  
The proposed NFC specific key agreement 
does not require any asymmetric cryptography and 
therefore reduces the computational requirements 
significantly. The scheme works with 100% ASK only 
where, both devices say Device A and Device B, send 
random data at the same time. In a setup phase the two 
devices synchronize on the exact timing of the bits and 
also on the amplitudes and phases of the RF signal. This 
is possible as devices can send and receive at the same 
time. After that synchronization, A and B are able to 
send at exactly the same time with exactly the same  
 
Figure5- Total signal seen on RF Field 
amplitudes and phases. While sending random bits of 0 
or 1, each device also listens to the RF field. When both 
devices send a zero, the sum signal is zero and an 
attacker, who is listening, would know that both devices 
sent a zero. This does not help. The same thing 
happens when both, A and B, send a one. The sum is 
the double RF signal and an attacker knows that both 
devices sent a one. It gets interesting once A sends a 
zero and B sends a one or vice versa. In this case both 
devices know what the other device has sent, because 
the devices know what they themselves have sent. 
However, an attacker only sees the sum RF signal and 
he cannot figure out which device sent the zero and 
which device sent the one. This idea is illustrated in 
Figure 4. 
In figure 5, the top figure shows the signals 
produced by A and by B. A sends the four bits: 0, 0, 1, 
and 1. B sends the four bits: 0, 1, 0, and 1. The lower 
graph shows the sum signal as seen by an attacker. It 
shows that for the bit combinations (A sends 0, B sends 
1) and (A sends 1, B sends 0) the result for the attacker 
is absolutely the same and the attacker cannot 
distinguish these two cases. The two devices now 
discard all bits, where both devices sent the same value 
and collect all bits, where the two devices sent different 
values. They can either collect the bits sent by A or by B. 
This must be agreed on start-up, but it doesn’t matter. 
This way A and B can agree on an arbitrary long shared 
secret. A new bit is generated with a probability of 50%. 
Thus, the generation of a 128 bit shared secret would 
need approximately 256 bits to be transferred. At a baud 
rate of 106 k Baud this takes about 2.4 ms, and is 
therefore fast enough for all applications. The security of 
this protocol in practice depends on the quality of the 
synchronization which is achieved between the two 
devices. Obviously, if an eavesdropper can distinguish 
data sent by A from data sent by B, the protocol is 
broken. The data must match in amplitude and in phase. 
Once the differences between A and B are significantly 
below the noise level received by the eavesdropper the 
protocol is secure. The level of security therefore also 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Near Field Communication  NFC  Technology 
G
l
o
b
a
l
 
J
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
o
f
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
 
S
c
i
e
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
 
 
 
 
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
 
X
I
 
I
s
s
u
e
 
I
I
I
 
V
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
I
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   55
M
ar
ch
 2
01
1 
 
 
©2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
 
depends on the signal quality at the receiver. The signal 
quality however again depends on many parameters 
(e.g. distance) of the eavesdropper. In practice the two 
devices A and B must aim at perfect synchronization. 
This can only be achieved if at least one of A or B is an 
active device to perform this synchronization. 
V. Conclusion 
We presented typical use cases for NFC 
interfaces. A list of threats has been derived and 
addressed. NFC by itself cannot provide protection 
against eavesdropping or data modifications. The only 
solution to achieve this is the establishment of a secure 
channel over NFC. This can be done very easily, 
because the NFC link is not susceptible to the Man-in-
the-Middle attack. Therefore, well known and easy to 
apply key agreement techniques without authentication 
can be used to provide a standard secure channel. This 
resistance against Man-in-the-Middle attacks makes 
NFC an ideal method for secure pairing of devices. 
Additionally, we introduced an NFC specific key 
agreement mechanism, which provides cheap and fast 
secure key agreement. 
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